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Abstract—Differential privacy is a rigorous privacy
standard that has been applied to a range of data
analysis tasks. To broaden the application scenarios of
differential privacy when data records have dependen-
cies, the notion of Bayesian differential privacy has
been recently proposed. However, it is unknown whether
Bayesian differential privacy preserves three nice prop-
erties of differential privacy: sequential composability,
parallel composability, and post-processing. In this pa-
per, we provide an affirmative answer to this ques-
tion; i.e., Bayesian differential privacy still have these
properties. The idea behind sequential composability is
that if we have m algorithms Y1, Y2, . . . , Ym, where
Y` is independently `-Bayesian differential private for
` = 1, 2, . . . ,m, then by feeding the result of Y1 into
Y2, the result of Y2 into Y3, and so on, we will fi-
nally have an
∑m
`=1 `-Bayesian differential private algo-
rithm. For parallel composability, we consider the sit-
uation where a database is partitioned into m dis-
joint subsets. The `-th subset is input to a Bayesian
differential private algorithm Y`, for ` = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Then the parallel composition of Y1, Y2, . . ., Ym
will be maxm`=1 `-Bayesian differential private. The post-
processing property means that a data analyst, without
additional knowledge about the private database, cannot
compute a function of the output of a Bayesian differential
private algorithm and reduce its privacy guarantee.
Keywords—Differential privacy, Bayesian differential
privacy, sequential composability, parallel composability, and
post-processing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy by Dwork et al. [1], [2] is a
robust privacy standard that has been used in a range
of data analysis tasks, since it provides a rigorous
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foundation for defining and preserving privacy. Differ-
ential privacy has received considerable attention in the
literature [3]–[8]. Apple has incorporated differential
privacy into its mobile operating system iOS 10 [9].
Google has implemented a differentially private tool
called RAPPOR in the Chrome browser to collect
information about clients [10]. A randomized algorithm
Y satisfies -differential privacy if for any adjacent
databases x and x′ differing in one record, and for any
event E, it holds that P[Y (x) ∈ E] ≤ eP[Y (x′) ∈ E],
where P[·] denotes the probability throughout this paper.
Intuitively, under differential privacy, an adversary given
access to the output does not have much confidence
to determine whether it was sampled from the proba-
bility distribution generated by the algorithm when the
database is x or when the database is x′.
Despite the powerfulness of differential privacy, it
has recently been observed by Kifer and Machanava-
jjhala [11] (see also [12]–[18]) that differential privacy
may not work as expected when the data tuples have
dependencies. To extend differential privacy when data
tuples have dependencies, Yang et al. [19] introduce the
notion of Bayesian differential privacy as follows. For
a database x with n tuples, let i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} be a
tuple index in the database and K ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}\{i}
be a tuple index set. An adversary denoted by A(i,K)
knows the values of all tuples in K (denoted by xK)
and attempts to attack the value of tuple i (denoted by
xi). For a randomized mechanism Y = P[y ∈ Y | x] on
database x, the Bayesian differential privacy leakage
(BDPL) of Y with respect to the adversary A(i,K)
is BDPLA(i,K)(Y ) = supxi,x′i,xK ,Y ln
P[y∈Y|xi,xK ]
P[y∈Y|x′i,xK ] . The
mechanism Y satisfies -Bayesian differential privacy if
BDPLA(i,K)(Y ) ≤  for any A(i,K).
In this paper, we formally show that similar to
differential privacy, Bayesian differential privacy has
the following nice properties: sequential composability,
parallel composability, and post-processing, as detailed
below [1], [21]. The idea behind sequential compos-
ability is that if we have m algorithms Y1, Y2, . . . , Ym,
where Y` is independently `-Bayesian differential pri-
vate for ` = 1, 2, . . . ,m, then by feeding the re-
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sult of Y1 into Y2, the result of Y2 into Y3, and so
on, we will finally have an
∑m
`=1 `-Bayesian differ-
ential private algorithm. For parallel composability,
we consider the situation where a database is par-
titioned into m disjoint subsets. The `-th subset is
input to a Bayesian differential private algorithm Y`,
for ` = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Then the parallel composition
of Y1, Y2, . . ., Ym will be maxm`=1 `-Bayesian differ-
ential private. The post-processing property means that
a data analyst, without additional knowledge about the
private database, cannot compute a function of the
output of a Bayesian differential private algorithm and
reduce its privacy guarantee.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the results on the sequential composability,
parallel composability, and post-processing properties of
Bayesian differential privacy. We elaborate their proofs
in Sections III. Section IV surveys related work, and
Section V concludes the paper.
II. THE RESULTS
We prove that similar to differential privacy, the
notion of Bayesian differential privacy has the following
properties: sequential composability, parallel compos-
ability, and post-processing.
A. Sequential composability
The idea behind sequential composability is that if
we have m algorithms which are each independently
Bayesian differential private, we would like to feed the
results from the first into the second, and so on, without
completely sacrificing privacy. Sequential composability
allows us to do this.
Theorem 1 (Sequential composability). Let x be
the database. For ` = 1, 2, . . . ,m, suppose a` rep-
resents an auxiliary input or intermediate output of
an algorithm. We have m algorithms Y`(x, a`) for
` = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Furthermore, assume that Y` is in-
dependently `-Bayesian differential private for ` =
1, 2, . . . ,m. Consider a sequence of computations
Y1(x) = z1,
Y2(x, z1) = z2,
. . . ,
Ym(x, z1, z2, . . . , zm−1) = zm,
where the expression here is general enough to cover
all cases regardless whether the input of Y` for ` =
1, 2, . . . ,m may or may not include partial or all
outputs z1, z2, . . . , z`−1 of Y1, Y2, . . . , Y`−1. Let the
mechanism Y denote the sequential composition of Y1,
Y2, . . ., Ym; i.e., Y (x) = zm. Then Y achieves
∑m
`=1 `-
Bayesian differential privacy.
We show Theorem 1 in Section III.
B. Parallel composability
Now we consider the situation where a single
database is partitioned into m disjoint subsets. Each
subset is input to a Bayesian differential private algo-
rithm. Then we consider the parallel composition of
the m algorithms. Specifically, we present the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 (Parallel composability). Let x be the
database whose tuples are indexed from 1 to n. Let H1,
H2, . . ., Hm be a partition of the index set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
For ` = 1, 2, . . . ,m, suppose a` represents an auxiliary
input or intermediate output of an algorithm. We have
m algorithms Y`(xH` , a`) for ` = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Fur-
thermore, assume that Y` is independently `-Bayesian
differential private for ` = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Consider a
sequence of computations
Y1(xH1) = y1,
Y2(xH2 , y1) = y2,
. . . ,
Ym(xHm , y1, y2, . . . , ym−1) = ym,
where the expression here is general enough to cover
all cases regardless whether the input of Y` for ` =
1, 2, . . . ,m may or may not include partial or all
outputs y1, y2, . . . , y`−1 of Y1, Y2, . . . , Y`−1. Let the
mechanism Y denote the parallel composition of Y1, Y2,
. . ., Ym; i.e., Y (x) = y1||y2|| . . . ||ym for y1, y2, . . ., ym
defined above, where “||” means concatenation. Then
Y achieves maxm`=1 `-Bayesian differential privacy.
Theorem 2 will be proved in the full version [20]
due to space limitation.
C. Post-Processing
Similar to differential privacy, our Bayesian differ-
ential privacy is also immune to post-processing: A data
analyst, without additional knowledge about the private
database, cannot compute a function of the output of
a Bayesian differential private algorithm and reduce its
privacy guarantee. Specifically, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 3 (Post-Processing). Let Y be an -Bayesian
differential private algorithm. Let Z be an arbitrary
randomized mapping (Z sees the output of Y , but not
the database). Then Z ◦ Y is -Bayesian differential
private, where Z ◦ Y is defined such that Z ◦ Y (x) =
Z
(
Y (x)
)
for each database x.
We establish Theorem 3 in the full version [20] due
to space limitation.
III. PROOFS
In this section, we prove the theorems. Without
loss of generality, we consider discrete outputs so we
use probability P [·] below. If the output is continuous,
we just replace probability P [·] with probability den-
sity function F [·], and the proof follows accordingly.
We introduce some notation as follows. The database
under consideration is modeled by a random variable
X = [X1, X2, . . . , Xn], where Xj for each j ∈
{1, . . . , n} is a tuple, which is also a random variable.
Let database x = [x1, x2, . . . , xn] be an instantiation
of X , so that each xj denotes an instantiation of Xj .
An adversary denoted by A(i,K) knows the values
of all tuples in K (denoted by xK) and attempts to
attack the value of tuple i (denoted by xi). We define
K := {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i} \K. Then for a randomized
mechanism Y = P[y ∈ Y | x] on database x, we write
P[y ∈ Y | xi, xK ] as P
[
Y (xi, xK , XK) ∈ Y
]
. For an
index set S, we group xj (resp., Xj) for j ∈ S and write
xS (resp., XS). Hence, the Bayesian differential privacy
leakage (BDPL) of Y with respect to the adversary
A(i,K) is
BDPLA(i,K)(Y )
= supxi,x′i,xK ,Y ln
P[y ∈ Y | xi, xK ]
P[y ∈ Y | x′i, xK ]
= supxi,x′i,xK ,Y ln
P
[
Y (xi, xK , XK) ∈ Y
]
P
[
Y (x′i, xK , XK) ∈ Y
] .
The mechanism Y satisfies
-Bayesian differential privacy if
BDPLA(i,K)(Y ) ≤ 
for any A(i,K), where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and K ⊆
{1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i}.
Proof of Theorem 1:
We have zm as the output of algorithm Y .
Then we consider P
[
Y (xi, xK , XK) = zm
]
so that
i is the index of the tuple to be protected by
the mechanism (i.e., inferred by the adversary),
where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, K ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i},
K
def
= {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i} \ K, xi ∈ domain(Xi),
x′i ∈ domain(Xi), xK ∈ domain(XK). By the law of
total probability, it follows that
P
[
Y (xi, xK , XK) = zm
]
=
∑
z1,z2,...,zm−1
P

Y1(xi, xK , XK) = z1,
Y2(xi, xK , XK , z1) = z2,
. . . ,
Ym(xi, xK , XK , z1, z2, . . . , zm−1) = zm
 . (1)
Since Y1, Y2, . . ., Ym are independent, (1) further
induces
P
[
Y (xi, xK , XK) = zm
]
=
∑
z1,z2,...,zm−1
P
[
Y1(xi, xK , XK) = z1
]
×P[Y2(xi, xK , XK , z1) = z2]
× . . .
×P[Ym(xi, xK , XK , z1, z2, . . . , zm−1) = zm]
 .
(2)
Now we consider the scenario where xi in the
database is replaced by x′i. Since Y` is `-Bayesian dif-
ferential private for ` = 1, 2, . . . ,m, we obtain for xi ∈
domain(Xi), x′i ∈ domain(Xi), xK ∈ domain(XK)
that
P
[
Y1(xi, xK , XK) = z1
]
≤ exp(1)× P
[
Y1(x
′
i, xK , XK) = z1
]
,
P
[
Y2(xi, xK , XK , z1) = z2
]
≤ exp(2)× P
[
Y2(x
′
i, xK , XK , z1) = z2
]
,
. . . ,
P
[
Ym(xi, xK , XK , z1, z2, . . . , zm−1) = zm
]
≤ exp(m)×
× P[Ym(x′i, xK , XK , z1, z2, . . . , zm−1) = zm].

(3)
Applying (3) to (2), we obtain
P
[
Y (xi, xK , XK) = zm
]
≤
∑
z1,z2,...,zm−1
exp(1) · P
[
Y1(x
′
i, xK , XK) = z1
]
× exp(2) · P
[
Y2(x
′
i, xK , XK , z1) = z2
]
× . . .
× exp(m) · P
[
Ym(x
′
i, xK , XK , zm−1) = zm
]

= exp
( m∑
`=1
`
)
×
∑
z1,z2,...,zm−1
P
[
Y1(x
′
i, xK , XK) = z1
]
×P[Y2(x′i, xK , XK , z1) = z2]
× . . .
×P[Ym(x′i, xK , XK , zm−1) = zm]
 . (4)
Replacing xi by x′i in (1), we get
P
[
Y (x′i, xK , XK) = zm
]
=
∑
z1,z2,...,zm−1
P
[
Y1(x
′
i, xK , XK) = z1
]
×P[Y2(x′i, xK , XK , z1) = z2]
× . . .
×P[Ym(x′i, xK , XK , zm−1) = zm]
 . (5)
Finally, (4) and (5) together imply the desired result
P
[
Y (xi, xK , XK) = zm
]
≤ exp
( m∑
`=1
`
)
· P[Y (x′i, xK , XK) = zm]. (6)
We can show (6) for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, K ⊆
{1, 2, . . . , n}\{i}, xi ∈ domain(Xi), x′i ∈ domain(Xi),
xK ∈ domain(XK), zm ∈ range(Y ). Hence, the
mechanism Y is
∑m
`=1 `-Bayesian differential private.
Proofs of Theorems 2 and 3: Due to space lim-
itation, we establish Theorems 2 and 3 in the full
version [20].
IV. RELATED WORK
The notion of differential privacy [1], [2] provides
a rigorous foundation for privacy protection. Intuitively,
differential privacy implies that changing one entry in
the database does not significantly change the query
output, so that an adversary, seeing the query output and
even knowing all records except the one to be inferred,
draws almost the same conclusion on whether or not a
record is in the database. Differential privacy is shown
to satisfy the properties of sequential composability,
parallel composability, and post-processing [1], [21].
Recently, Kairouz et al. [22] investigate the overall
privacy cost for the composition of differential private
algorithms. Their result improves those in prior work
[1], [2], [23], [24].
Although differential privacy has received consid-
erable interest in the literature [25]–[35], it has been
observed by Kifer and Machanavajjhala [11] (see also
[12]–[18]) that differential privacy may not work as
expected when the data tuples have dependencies. To
extend differential privacy for correlated data, prior
studies have investigated various privacy metrics [13]–
[18], [36]. One of the metrics receiving much attention
is the notion of Bayesian differential privacy introduced
by Yang et al. [19]. Yang et al. [19] further present
a mechanism that is only for the sum query on a
Gaussian Markov random field with positive correla-
tions and its extension to a discrete domain. In con-
trast, Zhao et al. [12] propose mechanisms to achieve
Bayesian differential privacy for any query on databases
with arbitrary tuple correlations.
Kifer and Machanavajjhala [15] generalize differen-
tial privacy to the Pufferfish framework, which takes
into consideration the generation of the database and
the adversarial belief about the database. Li et al. [37]
propose membership privacy in consideration of the
adversary’s prior beliefs as well. He et al. [14] study a
subclass of the Pufferfish framework, named the Blow-
fish framework, which uses deterministic policy con-
straints instead of probabilistic correlations to specify
adversarial knowledge about the database. Very recently,
Song et al. [17] propose a general mechanism to achieve
Pufferfish privacy. Song and Chaudhuri [7] further show
composition Properties of Pufferfish privacy for time-
series data. Zhu et al. [18] leverage linear relation-
ships among tuples, but this approach does not satisfy
any rigorous privacy metric. Liu et al. [16] present a
Laplace mechanism that handles pairwise correlations.
Xiao and Xiong [27] address differential privacy under
temporal correlations in the context of location privacy.
Kasiviswanathan and Smith [26] introduce the notion of
semantic privacy by modeling the external knowledge
via a prior probability distribution, and modeling con-
clusions via the corresponding posterior distribution.
Dwork and Rothblum [38] recently proposed the
notion of concentrated differential privacy, a relaxation
of differential privacy enjoying better accuracy than
differential privacy without compromising on cumula-
tive privacy loss over multiple computations. Motivated
by [38], Bun and Steinke [39] suggest a relaxation of
concentrated differential privacy. Jorgensen et al. [40]
introduce a new privacy definition called personalized
differential privacy, a generalization of differential pri-
vacy in which users specify a personal privacy require-
ment for their data.
V. CONCLUSION
Bayesian differential privacy has been recently pro-
posed to broaden the application scenarios of differential
privacy when data records have dependencies. In this
paper, we formally show that Bayesian differential pri-
vacy preserves three nice properties of differential pri-
vacy: sequential composability, parallel composability,
and post-processing.
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